# NATO Cohesion/Focus DA

## Notes

While the preinstitute DA thesis was about NATO focus on territorial defense – the new strategic concept reaffirms this IS the focus of NATO – by not including resiliency as a fourth core task, for example. The argument has now shifted a bit – NATO cohesion or unity, demonstrated by the Summit, necessary to deter China.

Different/new-ish link arguments, however, could be made based on the way that the plan implements the Strategic Concept – in other words, vague support for misinformation or for biotech [with concrete ways to do it] will undermine the unity and cohesion of the Alliance – triggering old problems of consensus building. The plan itself would require consensus building – that also undermines the unity of the alliance.

Prioritization of policies by NATO key to credibility as well – and you could develop this argument later into a common funding argument, in our opinion.

Another element of the DA is whether or not EU-NATO cooperation trades off with resources for NATO – and so you could definitely use these cards as part of the ‘internal net benefit’ to EU CP. Some cards argue that the unity from Ukraine invasion risks fracturing if there is NO acknowledgement of strategic autonomy/responsibility [see cards above on EU CP]

## 1nc

#### Uniqueness - Madrid provided turning point for NATO – but cohesion not guaranteed – must be vigilent

**Brotman, 2022**

[Alexander, political risk and intelligence analyst with a focus on EU politics and security developments, “Opinion – The NATO Madrid Summit and the Alliance’s New Dawn” E-International Relations, July 5 2022 <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/07/05/opinion-the-nato-madrid-summit-and-the-alliances-new-dawn/> GDI-TM]

The Madrid Summit also marks a major turning point for NATO and transatlantic relations in (a) the post-Cold War, (b) post-9/11 and (c) post-Afghan War eras. The alliance is adapting to new threats and challenges whilst expanding its membership, all while recommitting resources to its original strategic adversary. It is easy to conclude that NATO has the upper hand and Moscow will fade into irrelevance, it’s actions in Ukraine proving that it should have no place at the table of respectable nations. However, NATO’s continued strength and unity is far from assured, and it will be important for European leaders not to become complacent. At the beginning of 2022, few would have predicted that NATO would be in the position it is today. A moment of crisis can unexpectedly galvanise an alliance of 30 very different member states stretching across three continents and with distinct histories. However, it can also reveal where true interests and values lie, and where the fissures that will inevitably outlast the current crisis are located and threaten the alliance’s response to the next challenge once the platitudes and commitments made in Madrid are long past. For now, however, Madrid is its own form of ‘Zeitenwende’, an unexpected but welcome watershed moment that demands bold and inspiring action amidst political upheaval.

#### Link - NATO’s effectiveness depends on prioritization – the plan breaks with that by prioritizing [] —must resist temptation to “do everything”

Moller, Seton Hall Assistant Professor, ‘20

[Sara Bjerg Moller, Assistnat Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, “It Will Take More than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise,” WAR ON THE ROCKS, 9—25—20, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/>, accessed 6-9-22]

In short, wherever the Biden presidential delegation goes, it will be met with requests that Washington — and with it, the NATO alliance — prioritize everything, thereby fulfilling the old adage that, “When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.” Given the precarious state of international relations today, the temptation to do more is understandably strong. It is easy to understand why, in the present climate of global instability, calls for the transatlantic alliance to reinforce and strengthen its existing commitments while simultaneously adding new mandates, missions, and programs are popular. Rather than adding more items to its already crowded agenda, however, the time has come for not just the United States but also NATO to consider doing less but doing it better.

#### Impact module

## Uniqueness

### Uniqueness and link helper – Post-Strategic Concept Moves matter

#### Uniqueness – Strategic Concept 2022 and statements of action assume political significance

**Webber,** Professor of International Politics at the University of Birmingham and the 2022/23 Senior Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College, **2022**

[Mark “Extending NATO: retirement plan not required” NATO Review 04 April 2022 [https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/04/04/extending-nato-retirement-plan-not-required/index.html accessed 6.16.2022](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/04/04/extending-nato-retirement-plan-not-required/index.html%20accessed%206.16.2022) GDI-TM]

Strategic foresight Survival and success also depend on having the right strategy, but obtaining such a thing is difficult. Some scholars, aware of the bureaucratic and political blinkers that impede clear thinking, have bemoaned the ‘forgotten’ or ‘lost’ art of strategy-making. Others have pointed to strategy’s illusory nature, given its application to circumstances that are usually too unpredictable and too complex to produce the intended results. Despite these obstacles, strategy is ubiquitous. No organisation - whether a government, a military, a company or, indeed, an alliance – can in good conscience face the world without one. Whatever its limitations, strategy is better than the alternatives: taking a shot in the dark, relying on primordial concepts such as honour, reputation and glory, or falling back on habit and path-dependent thinking. Good strategy needs to be constantly adjusted to changing circumstances. It also needs to be appreciative of what is possible (not just what is desirable), and conscious of the resources necessary to meet specified objectives. Above all, as Sir Lawrence Freedman has argued, to adopt a strategy is to embrace choice; it is a recognition that the environment an actor faces can be tamed and not simply allowed to run amok. NATO sits reasonably well within this understanding. Throughout its history, the Alliance has paid considerable attention to formulating and agreeing strategy, and then coordinating Allied efforts on the basis of constantly updated concepts, political guidance, and military doctrine. These efforts often assume enormous political significance. The 1967 Harmel Report on ‘The Future Tasks of the Alliance’, according to one assessment, rescued NATO from ‘the most severe crisis in its history’ following France’s departure from the Alliance’s integrated military structures. The 1990 London Declaration and the 1991 Strategic Concept were similarly pathbreaking and helped NATO transition into the post-Cold War period. These precedents mean NATO’s more recent top-level documents – the Strategic Concepts of 1999 and 2010 as well as the anticipated update of 2022 – come freighted with huge significance. Externally, they are NATO’s public face on the world: key statements of relevance and purpose. Internally, they are important exercises in consensus building among the Allies. But while significant in their own right, the Strategic Concepts are only one expression of NATO’s strategic coherence. Beneath them sit obscure, often classified but, nonetheless, operationally significant statements of purpose. In recent years such documents have been adopted at pace. In 2019, NATO approved a new Military Strategy, and in 2020 two implementing documents - a Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and a Warfighting Capstone Concept. In 2021, the Allies agreed to action plans on climate change and Women, Peace and Security, as well as a ‘Strengthened Resilience Commitment’ and a cyber defence policy. An ‘Overarching Space Policy’ followed in January 2022. NATO is due to formally adopt its new Strategic Concept at the Madrid summit in June 2022. The draft is already being reworked in light of the Ukraine crisis. It seems likely also that the NATO Military Strategy will end up with a revamp shortly after.

### Uniqueness – Biden increase cohesion now

#### Biden expenditure of international capital to fix Trump’s mistakes increases NATO cohesion

**World Politics Review Editorial Board, 2022**

[“U.S. Security Policy Under Biden” World Politics Review, June 22, 2022 <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/29564/for-biden-s-security-policy-look-beyond-us-defense-budget> GDI-TM]

Upon taking office, President Joe Biden made it a priority to repair the damage his predecessor, Donald Trump, had done to relationships with the United States’ long-standing allies and partners, including South Korea and Japan, but particularly in Europe. Early on, Biden reassured European allies of Washington’s commitment to their security, promising them, “America is back. The trans-Atlantic alliance is back.” Despite some missteps along the way, the political capital Biden invested in shoring up ties with Europe, in particular, has paid off during the current standoff with Russia over Ukraine. NATO’s cohesion in the runup to the invasion and the robustness of the U.S.-led economic and security response in its aftermath are testament to the alliance’s value to the U.S.—as well as the importance of U.S. leadership in times of crisis.

### Uniqueness – NATO cohesion now

#### Summit proves that collective deterrence and defense key focus of NATO now

**Ceylan,** president of Ankara Policy Center and previously served as permanent representative of Turkey to NATO, **2022**

[Mehmet, “Experts react: What the NATO summit breakthrough means for Turkey and the Alliance” Atlantic Council July 1 2022 <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/experts-react-what-the-nato-summit-breakthrough-means-for-turkey-and-the-alliance/> GDI-TM]

The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014 has entirely changed the security landscape, not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but globally. It has fundamentally altered threat perceptions beyond the Alliance, leading Finland and Sweden to officially apply for membership in NATO. These two countries have indeed crossed the Rubicon and deserted their neutrality in response to persistent Russian belligerence in the middle of Europe. Their decision to combine their efforts and assets with the Alliance against Russian aggression is natural and legitimate. Hence the need to incorporate Finland and Sweden into the Alliance family. The trilateral memorandum signed among Turkey, Finland, and Sweden on June 28 is a welcome development designed to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and unity, and further strengthen the Alliance. It is commonplace in NATO to consult on and negotiate over any dispute among allies and would-be allies to find a common ground. That is how NATO plays its role, and at the end a solution accommodating such concerns is found by consensus. It is also true that once new members accede to NATO, they are bound by the decisions previously taken by the Alliance on a wide range of subjects. In NATO there exists a robust set of decisions and practices in fighting terrorism, beginning with the intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, there is already an agreement comprising all sorts of conceptual work and practices in different geographical theaters on combatting terrorism, developed within NATO and binding on all members. The newly adopted Strategic Concept (SC) clearly identifies Russia and “terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations” as the primary sources of threats in a 360-degree manner and across all three core tasks of NATO: collective deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Given that terrorism is “the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity,” as defined in the SC, it makes sense both for Finland and Sweden to cooperate with Turkey in combatting terrorism as one of the primary sources of threats against Alliance interests. In a nutshell, collective deterrence and defense against actual and potential adversaries, nipping crises in the bud, and expanding the web of networks with partners under challenging circumstances are the main tasks of NATO in the next decade. The main center of gravity for NATO is its solidarity, unity, and cohesion, including all allies and those set to become allies. The summit decisions in their entirety will help NATO to navigate the troubled waters ahead over the long term.

#### NATO renewed strength and invigoration of alliance increase alliance cohesion

**Brotman, 2022**

[Alexander, political risk and intelligence analyst with a focus on EU politics and security developments, “Opinion – The NATO Madrid Summit and the Alliance’s New Dawn” E-International Relations, July 5 2022 <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/07/05/opinion-the-nato-madrid-summit-and-the-alliances-new-dawn/> GDI-TM]

After years of its relevance being questioned by former President Trump and even being described as ‘brain-dead’ by French President Macron, NATO is meeting at Madrid at a time of renewed strength and invigoration of the alliance. The past few months have witnessed significant alliance cohesion in the face of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, with two new states, Sweden, and Finland, set to join after Turkey has lifted its opposition. NATO’s cause for existence has never seemed clearer, yet serious rifts remain, and the unity of the alliance is not guaranteed as the war in Ukraine goes on and domestic pressures across member states increase. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has led NATO closer to Russia’s borders, not further away, and more troops will be permanently stationed on NATO’s eastern flank, including a new permanent U.S. base in Poland. For Putin, this is undoubtedly the opposite effect of what he intended, however Ukraine is no closer to joining NATO and the prospect of a prolonged conflict in its disputed territories will likely stall Kyiv’s accession for the foreseeable future.

### Uniqueness – Summit

#### NATO unity high post summit – risks still exist threatening unity

**Kupchan** Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations **2022**

[Charles, “NATO’s Hard Road Ahead The Greatest Threats to Alliance Unity Will Come After the Madrid Summit” Foreign Affairs Magazine June 29, 2022 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-29/natos-hard-road-ahead> gdi-tm]

Thanks to Russian President Vladimir Putin, NATO’s Madrid Summit takes place this week against the backdrop of a resurgent Western alliance. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine compels NATO to return to its founding mission of providing collective defense against Russia. Members of the alliance are demonstrating remarkable unity and resolve as they funnel arms to Ukraine, increase defense spending, bolster the alliance’s eastern flank, and impose severe economic sanctions against Russia.

The invasion of Ukraine has shown that NATO is back, but the reality is that it never went away. The alliance was actually in good shape even before Putin launched his errant war, which is one of the reasons that it has been able to respond to developments in Ukraine with such alacrity and solidarity. Since the Cold War’s end, NATO has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to the times, undertaking operations far afield, including in Afghanistan and in the Balkans, and opening its doors to Europe’s new democracies. As a consequence of the war in Ukraine, an already strong NATO just got stronger.

But despite its clean bill of health and demonstrable unity, NATO faces a thicket of thorny issues, and discussions in Madrid will only just begin to address them. The war in Ukraine will, of course, dominate the summit. The conversation is poised to focus on the easy part: getting more arms to the frontlines. But NATO also needs to take up the hard part: when and how to marry the flow of weapons to a diplomatic strategy aimed at producing a cease-fire and follow-on negotiations over territory. The urgency of making that pivot stems from the need not just to end the death and destruction but to limit the war’s economic spillover, which could threaten the Atlantic alliance from within by eroding solidarity and weakening the West’s democratic foundations. The conflict in Ukraine also puts on NATO’s agenda a set of additional challenges: managing the future of enlargement, channeling Europe’s growing geopolitical aspirations, and building a transatlantic architecture that can accommodate the ever more complex and diverse issues facing the West.

### Uniqueness – Russia Invasion increase cohesion

#### Russia invasion increase NATO unity

**Radio Free Europe, 2022**

[“Biden Says Putin Didn't Expect 'Cohesion' Among Western Allies” RFE/RL March 24 2022 <https://www.rferl.org/a/biden-putin-western-cohesion/31769120.html> GDI-TM]

U.S. President Joe Biden says President Vladimir Putin miscalculated Western resolve before launching Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and didn't think Western countries would remain unified in their use of sanctions and support for arming Ukrainian forces. Biden told reporters at a news conference in Brussels that Russia's invasion of Ukraine had built greater unity within NATO, the European Union, and the Group of Seven economies. "NATO has never, never been more united than it is today. Putin is getting exactly the opposite of what he intended to have as a consequence of going into Ukraine," Biden said after a meeting with NATO leaders. Putin "didn't think we could sustain this cohesion," Biden said. NATO countries and other allies have imposed harsh sanctions against Russia, crippling the ruble and the Russian economy. So far, however, the European Union has not gone as far as the United States and banned oil and natural gas from Russia.

### AT: Non-unique Strategic Concept did Resilience

#### The Strategic Concept did not center resilience as a core task – it merely incorporated resilience as a tool for other goals

Scheunemann 22 [Leah, Deputy Director, Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council, “Scowcroft strategy scorecard: NATO’s Strategic Concept clear on threats, but will require sustained commitment from Alliance,” 07/07/22, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/scorecard/scowcroft-strategy-scorecard-natos-strategic-concept/>, accessed 07/12/22, GDI-JCR]

The Strategic Concept has to be viewed as a top-level document that sets the stage for follow-on work at all levels of the Alliance and by member states and one would not demand a list of defined, attainable, or measurable goals from the document. The Strategic Concept strongly defines NATO’s goal as safeguarding its members and its values and reaffirmed NATO’s three core tasks, in order: deterrence and defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. I appreciate that the Strategic Concept did not confuse NATO’s purpose with a fourth core task of resilience and instead wove resilience throughout the strategy as a core tool and competency for achieving all of NATO’s goals, and that the strategy highlight’s NATO’s global role, but continues to bite off a lot to chew in the years to come.

## Links

#### \*\*note a few of these are in the original preinstitute file – avoid duplication

### Link – consensus building

#### Consensus building governance means adopting and procuring tech takes long process involving different funding mechanisms

**Cook**, CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives Group **and Dowd**, senior international security and defense policy expert at Rand, **2022**

[CYNTHIA R. COOK AND ANNA M. DOWD “HOW TO GET NATO FORCES THE TECHNOLOGY THEY NEED” WOR MAY 13, 2022 <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-to-get-nato-forces-the-technology-they-need/#:~:text=To%20increase%20operational%20effectiveness%2C%20NATO,architecture%20approaches%20for%20NATO%20weapons> GDI-TM]

In a Feb. 26 Twitter post, Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s vice prime minister and minister for digital transformation, asked the SpaceX chief executive, Elon Musk, to provide Ukraine with Starlink terminals to enable satellite-based communications. In less than 48 hours, Starlink user kits arrived in Ukraine, immediately improving the command-and-control ability of Ukraine’s military. For those of us who study the NATO acquisition process, it is almost impossible to imagine the alliance identifying a requirement and adopting a solution so quickly, no matter how urgent the circumstances. Among the many challenges would be the alliance’s elaborate, consensus-based governing structure, as well as the divergent interests and funding mechanisms among the 30 member states. This is why, in 2016, the International Board of Auditors concluded that NATO struggles to provide commanders with required capabilities on time and estimated that common-funded capabilities required an average of 16 years from development to delivery. The complexity of modern weapons systems and the challenges of interoperability mean that any active engagement will lead to the identification of new technical requirements for NATO. The alliance needs the processes and structures in place to rapidly identify these requirements and procure solutions. This includes giving commanders the authority to make decisions without the lengthy consensus-building approach that may be reasonable, if slow, in peacetime but is not effective during war.

#### Despite reforms, process include consensus based control – protracted development process

**Cook**, CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives Group **and Dowd**, senior international security and defense policy expert at Rand, **2022**

[CYNTHIA R. COOK AND ANNA M. DOWD “HOW TO GET NATO FORCES THE TECHNOLOGY THEY NEED” WOR MAY 13, 2022 <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-to-get-nato-forces-the-technology-they-need/#:~:text=To%20increase%20operational%20effectiveness%2C%20NATO,architecture%20approaches%20for%20NATO%20weapons> GDI-TM]

NATO has previously sought to improve the governance, speed, and efficiency of its capability-delivery process. For example, in 2018 NATO adopted a new governance model for common-funded capabilities. It has undertaken efforts to enhance collaboration between strategic commands (Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium and Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, VA), called for the exploration of alternative acquisition strategies to support technology development, and created the Office of the Chief Information Officer to accelerate the delivery of computer and information systems. Furthermore, in October 2021 NATO launched the first $1.1 billion Innovation Fund, and last month announced the creation of the first ever Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic to harness cutting-edge technologies as part of the NATO 2030 agenda. These are valuable steps, but they do not address the fundamental challenge of rapidly acquiring common capabilities. There are still many residual processes where consensus-based control is inherently prioritized over speed, flexibility, innovation, and the deployment of prototypes at the end of their development phases. NATO leaders recognize the ongoing challenge. In a recent speech to the North Atlantic Council, the supreme allied commander transformation, Gen. Philippe Lavigne, stressed that one of his key priorities is to ensure the timely delivery of new and critical capabilities, adding that “we need to change the rules and make them work for us, not against us.” But NATO leaders cannot fix this alone — the alliance’s 30 member nations are the ones that will have to agree on the solution. Exploring alternatives and getting the allies to agree on a solution will be difficult. It can happen on a NATO-wide basis, or some subset of member nations can take on the challenge and lead the effort, which may then be adopted by others.

### Link – focus [read v resiliency]

#### Focus link - narrowly focusing alliance tasks necessary to check China threat

Moller & Rynning, Seton Hall & University of Southern Denmark Professors, ‘21

[Sara Fjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University and Sten Rynning, Professor, Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 44 n. 1, Spring 2021, p. 193]

NATO’s continued transformation in the coming years seems all but certain; less certain is what it will transform into. The alliance has survived this long by adapting. But unlike during previous rounds of adaptation that involved the alliance taking on more responsibilities and tasks, the coming decades—whose defining feature will be the continued rise of China—will require a much more narrowly focused alliance. For nigh on three decades, NATO had the luxury of pondering what kind of alliance it wanted to be as it searched for a new raison d’etre in the reduced threat environment following the end of the Cold War. But the contrast between the 1990s and today’s deluge of challenges and threats is stark, and NATO no longer has the luxury of time.

To ensure the alliance’s future operational utility, the alliance must embrace its original collective defense identity and look for ways to streamline, and where possible reduce, its existing collective security and crisis management activities. In addition to offloading existing responsibilities to the EU and UN, NATO should think twice before taking on new mandates and avoid elevating new tasks like resiliency or counterterrorism missions and assigning them equal importance to Article 5. The alternative to the vision outlined here is an alliance increasingly weighed down by a myriad of tasks, unable to prioritize among them, and lacking both the political will and financial resources to perform its main function. An overburdened NATO risks being unable to fulfill its chief purpose of collective defense, thereby increasing the risk of further fracturing within the alliance. The proposed course of action will by no means be an easy one. But it provides the best chance to guarantee that the transatlantic alliance will have the capabilities and assets needed to meet the challenges posed by China’s rise.

### Link – implementation

#### Implementation of new Strategic Concept key to alliance credibility

**McElroy, National News, 2022**

[Damien, “Nato is ripe for reform, but can Madrid begin the process?” National News Opinion June 26 2022 <https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2022/06/27/can-america-ensure-natos-survival-until-2040/> GDI-TM]

This week, Nato will reveal its strategic concept. In 1997, the Nato summit in Madrid set the stage for the group's enlargement. When the last strategic concept came out in 2009, Russia was still being categorised as a strategic partner. At the closing of a 20-year cycle, a new blueprint for the alliance is clearly needed. The growing push within EU states for strategic autonomy could come in part through a unified defence policy. One of the most important preparatory meetings that Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg held was with French President Emmanuel Macron last week. Mr Macron probed how the strategic concept could incorporate EU ambitions. The Elysee Palace can no longer afford to talk about the Nato alliance being "brain dead". Now it says it has suffered an “electric shock” and is demanding answers. America’s pivot to Asia is certainly not dead. Indeed its move to seal Aukus, a strategic rearmament agreement with the UK and Australia, shows that it is ambitious in the platforms it seeks. For now, the Europeans are not actively challenging the US over China in the way that was true two years ago. They may be seeking to end their cheap energy relationship with Russia, but they are not altering their trade-focused relationship with Beijing. **Nato’s efforts to flesh out a strategic outlook that straddles those interests is going to be a key test of its thinking** next week. **How it implements that approach and sticks to it when it is inevitably tested is one of the greatest challenges facing the alliance.** With the US mid-term election looming and the short run-up to the next presidential election, Nato is hostage to another concern. Europeans are broadly convinced that Donald Trump stands a good chance of being elected US president in 2024. What chance of the alliance holding together, then, is probably best described as slim to nil.

### Link - Resiliency

#### Resilience strategies undermine the core collective defense mission

Larsen, CSS Senior Researcher, ‘22

[Henrik Larsen, PhD, Senior Researcher, Center for Sexurity Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” LAWFARE, 5—22—22, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china>, accessed 5-23-22]

In the coming years, NATO needs to balance the impetus toward being a “liberal bulwark” with its traditional role as a defense alliance. To do so will require a thorough understanding of the strategic environment, particularly the threat posed by Russia and the challenges posed by China. NATO must adapt by better delineating what aspects of security planning it is best suited to and what would be better delegated to other institutions, while prioritizing partnerships that share NATO values. As the drafting of the Strategic Concept is being finalized and moving toward formal adoption by the NATO allies in Madrid in June, it is crucial to avoid the temptation to define “resilience” as a core task. The Strategic Concept from 2010 outlined the core tasks of “collective defense,” “crisis management” and “cooperative security,” but adding a fourth core task this time around would further confuse what is core to the alliance. NATO needs to prioritize and refocus on collective defense, its original and continued raison d’être. The digital age and the significance of political warfare is bringing about new challenges, but the transatlantic alliance is better off tying resilience to collective defense as an integral part of it rather than risking the inflation of core tasks.

#### Focus on resiliency risks drift from core mission of defense capabilities

Larsen, CSS Senior Researcher, ‘22

[Henrik Larsen, PhD, Senior Researcher, Center for Sexurity Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” LAWFARE, 5—22—22, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china>, accessed 5-23-22]

Since 2014, NATO has become increasingly aware of the nonmilitary challenges to its unity and resilience but has adapted only in certain respects. It adopted the so-called baseline requirements in 2016, against which it can measure individual allies’ level of resilience regarding their provision of essential services to their domestic populations. These basics that would be necessary to withstand a crisis include access to food, water and energy supplies; maintenance of core functions of government; and resilient civil transportation systems. However, the baseline requirements are technical measurements that do not adequately grasp the political nature of the challenges that Russia and China pose to alliance unity. Moreover, their focus on civil preparedness, resource management and infrastructure does not seem to fit squarely within the competencies of a defense alliance. NATO may be on a slippery slope with the scope of its resilience concept drifting further away from its defense capabilities.

NATO, as an organization and as an alliance of states, is aware of the challenges to transatlantic resilience and cohesion that Russia and China pose, but the alliance has not been able to agree on the issues to which it can bring added value. The situation today stands in contrast to the situation during the Cold War when NATO successfully calibrated resilience to the ability to resist an armed attack by focusing on civil emergency planning. Russia and China are illiberal challengers that add new meaning to transatlantic security cooperation, but NATO’s adaptation will depend on the extent to which the United States and Europe can find agreement on investment in transatlantic security.

### Link – small members key

#### Concepts and strategies of small states develop key to risk of innovation to be diffused through alliance - aff focuses on the US

**Kallenborn, 2022**

[Zachary, “Can a Focus on Innovation Save NATO?” National Interest June 23, 2022 <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/can-focus-innovation-save-nato-203158> GDI-TM]

The NATO strategic concept should define and enhance NATO’s role as an innovation foundry. As a confederated alliance, NATO has a major strategic advantage in granting member states the freedom to innovate and diverge in how they make crucial defense and security decisions. Smaller states with fewer resources need to find more effective and efficient ways to use them. But the concepts, policies, doctrines, and strategies the smaller states develop may help inform the practices of larger member states. This allows the inherent risk of innovation to be diffused throughout the alliance.

### Link – Single focus tech/ prioritization

#### NATO requires EDT prioritization – plan only broadly increases innovation in EDTs

**Soare, 2021**

[Simona, “Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies” GMF, JUNE 11, 2021 <https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies> GDI-TM]

Figuring out the added value of NATO-enabled innovation in EDTs and how to build a sustainable and mutually reinforcing relationship with prevalent national innovation efforts is another key element. Prioritization is essential in innovation efforts, particularly when there is little certainty about what technology areas or combinations yield sustainable strategic advantages. Without discussing the merits of every innovation effort, NATO should adopt a strategic “systems of systems” focus on innovation in EDTs. While there is merit in strategic planning for individual technology areas, the added value in alliance defense innovation efforts is a more applied focus on technology convergence—what mix of new technologies deliver the more sustainable strategic military advantage in the medium- and long-term in the context of great-power competition. For example, the integration of AI, autonomy, and digitally enabled human enhancement opens multiple possibilities of adversarial exploitation of the cognitive and physical domain.23 Some work in this field is ongoing, but it requires more investment, frequent iteration, and a larger scale. In February, the Science and Technology Organization organized a two-day tabletop exercise that explored combinations of new technologies and their efficiency in various scenarios.24 Similarly, in May the European Defense Agency organized a ten-day Technology Foresight Exercise to inform the revision of the European research and capability development priorities.25

## Internal Links

### Implementation of Strategic concept

#### \*Prioritization of implementation of Strategic Concept key to achieving objectives despite purpose of strategic concept

Agachi 22 [Anca, Associate Director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council, “Scowcroft strategy scorecard: NATO’s Strategic Concept clear on threats, but will require sustained commitment from Alliance,” 07/07/22, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/scorecard/scowcroft-strategy-scorecard-natos-strategic-concept/>, accessed 07/12/22, GDI-JCR]

Defined goals Does the strategy define clear goals? Given the function that the Strategic Concept is meant to perform, I think the document sets a reasonably good level of ambition, especially in clarifying NATO’s updated defense and deterrence posture and mainstreaming resilience across all allied core tasks. Where I think the concept misses an opportunity is in clarifying the ambition of its medium to longer-term goals relating to NATO modernization and adaptation: seizing the advantages of the ongoing technological revolution, clarifying NATO’s responsibilities in combatting (and adapting) to climate change, and suggesting a roadmap for engaging NATO partners, especially those in the Indo-Pacific, to mention a few glaring examples. These may not be the priority topics of today, but ambitious structural change is essential in ensuring the Alliance is prepared for them tomorrow. Clear lines of effort Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of NATO activities? With such a long “laundry list”, prioritization will remain an issue and will likely be decided by the art (and bureaucracy) of implementation. I would have loved to see more details on the “how” of achieving some of the objectives set, for instance more clarity on burden-sharing in the current environment or a roadmap for elevating the NATO-EU partnership to the next level to enable collaboration especially on sub-threshold challenges such as disinformation, resilience, or energy security. Realistic implementation guidelines Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it? The key objective of the Strategic Concept is to provide high-level political guidance, which it does well, so judging on implementation is somewhat beyond its scope. For what it’s worth, the key hurdles in implementation in my view stem from the economic context, specifically growing inflation and slowing gains which may hinder the ability to implement the force posture sought and maintain high troop readiness levels. Alternatively, an exogenous shock may also change the threat assessment within the Alliance, and split allied focus.

### Unity key to deter China

#### China is watching to see if the unity lasts

**Cheng, 22**

[Evelyn Cheng, “China watches warily as Ukraine makes U.S., EU and Japan strengthen their alliance,” CNBC, 3-8-22, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/09/china-watches-as-ukraine-war-makes-us-eu-and-japan-show-unity.html, GDI-TM]

Since taking office last year, President Joe Biden has pursued a strategy of restoring relationships with allies to put pressure on Beijing. The Russian invasion of Ukraine nearly two weeks ago showed what those allies can do. For China, the speed and severity with which the U.S. and its allies sanctioned Russia is a warning sign that could guide future economic and foreign policy. Chinese officials have increased efforts to buttress their country’s self-reliance since President Donald Trump sanctioned telecommunications giant Huawei and slapped tariffs on billions of dollars’ worth of Chinese goods. But Trump did all that singlehandedly — while simultaneously damaging ties with Europe and provoking uncertainty among U.S. allies in Asia. The response to Ukraine has been anything but a go-it-alone move by the United States. “Given the success that the U.S. has had in coordinating the financial sanctions and export controls not just with Europe but also with Japan, a key player in tech value chains — this is extremely alarming for China,” said Reva Goujon, senior manager for the China corporate advisory team at Rhodium Group. “This is a very multilateral moment,” Goujon said. “At a high level, you would think China would benefit from [the U.S.] having a big distraction in Europe, but actually [this] only accentuates those policy debates over critical exposure and vulnerabilities to Chinese supply chains.” From Germany to Japan, many countries have joined the U.S. in freezing the assets of Russian oligarchs, restricting access of Russia’s biggest banks to the global financial system, and cutting off Russia from critical technology. China condemns ‘unilateral’ sanctions On Monday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the friendship between China and Russia is “rock solid.” He pointed specifically to a joint statement between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin last month, in which China and Russia described “international relations entering a new era” and “no limits” to their countries’ cooperation. Beijing has refused to call Russia’s attack on Ukraine an invasion. China has focused on promoting negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and it opposes the economic measures that have been taken against Russia. China’s Foreign Ministry has repeatedly said it “opposes all illegal unilateral sanctions.” It has not elaborated on how the sanctions against Russia, which have been imposed by many countries, could be considered unilateral. When asked about an “alliance of Western nations” pushing Russia out of the SWIFT banking network, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin said last week that “China does not agree with resolving issues with sanctions, still less unilateral sanctions that lack the basis of international law,” according to an English-language press conference transcript. Later in the week, spokesperson Wang reiterated that position in response to a question about whether Western sanctions on trade with Russia would affect China. Sanctions “only create serious difficulties to the economy and livelihood of relevant countries and further intensify division and confrontation,” he said. China’s Europe balance Escalating trade tensions between the U.S. and China in the last few years had already accelerated Beijing’s efforts to firm up ties with Europe. The Ukraine war threatens all that. China’s “balancing act” of trying to quietly support Russia while keeping up relations with Europe is “going to be more and more difficult. That has consequences for trade links, primarily with the EU,” said Nick Marro, global trade leader at The Economist Intelligence Unit. Marro noted that reputational risks rise for China “the more China tries to fudge its stance on Russia and focus its criticism on NATO and the U.S.” “China was hoping to use the EU as a way to offset the pressure it was facing from the U.S.,” Marro said. “Right now, Europe sees Russia as an existential threat.” “Right now the impact for China [from the sanctions] really is secondary,” Marro said. “This conflict raises bigger questions around industrial policy and China’s diplomatic relations with the West.”

## Impacts

### Ukraine key to Taiwan

#### Strong NATO in Europe is key to check China – losing ground to Russia in the west dooms Taiwan in the east.

Shepherd 22 [Robin, vice president of Halifax International Security Forum, “Dangerous liaison: U.S. and allies target China-Russia ties,” 07/07/22, <https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2022/07/07/dangerous-liaison-u-s-and-allies-target-china-russia-ties-00044380>, accessed 07/13/22, GDI-JCR]

NATO Secretary General JENS STOLTENBERG said last week that NATO was in it with Ukraine for “as long as it takes.” Bravo! But Stoltenberg — effective, intelligent, articulate, and resolute — remains a diplomat. If the will from political leaders in NATO starts to fragment and crumble beneath him as economic recession bites and Ukraine gets lost over the years in the mists of the various political conversations in the 30 allied countries, it is questionable whether the alliance will be able to do more than prevent spillover from the Ukraine conflict into wider Europe. That still counts for an awful lot, but it doesn’t count for as much as simultaneously rebuffing the strategic challenges posed by China. NATO firmly rejects the suggestion that China and Russia together are too much to handle. Spokesperson OANA LUNGESCU told China Watcher: “Both authoritarian regimes are pushing back against the international rules-based order, so we are strengthening NATO in an era of strategic competition and deepening our partnerships with like-minded nations around the world, including our Indo-Pacific partners.… NATO does not have the luxury of choosing our challenges, we must face them all.” Whether, amid the crisis in Ukraine, most European allies truly see things as NATO HQ does is open to debate. But some of the most important allies do at least see a clear linkage between Ukraine and Taiwan, raising hopes that VLADIMIR PUTIN’s war of aggression does not necessarily presage a narrowing of their focus into a literal and figurative “fortress Europe.” “We need to learn the lessons of Ukraine, which was that we could have ensured that Ukraine had the defensive capability earlier," Britain’s Foreign Secretary LIZ TRUSS said last week. "And that would have done more to deter … Putin from invading, so-called deterrence by denial, and that is a similar approach to the approach we need to take for other sovereign nations, including Taiwan.” I warned in a December edition of China Watcher of a “perfect geo-political storm” on both sides of the Eurasian landmass in which Russia forges into Ukraine while China does something similar in Taiwan. Allies that are skeptical we can afford to meet the China and Russia challenges simultaneously only need to consider the consequences — to their own economies if nothing else — of a war over Taiwan taking place alongside the war in Ukraine. If the argument of global good citizenship or saving democracies doesn’t fly, perhaps rational self-interest will. Beijing responded to Truss’s remarks in typically indignant fashion, lodging an official complaint with Britain for her “arrogance.” But the PRC seems even more outraged than usual since its inclusion in NATO’s Strategic Concept. It looks rattled, offering a perversely hopeful sign, perhaps, that China’s loudly and publicly vocalized remonstrations are themselves evidence that the U.S. and its allies are not, after all, likely to take their eye off the ball in Asia due to the crisis in Eastern Europe. NATO’s warming relations in the Indo-Pacific have certainly got Beijing’s attention. As proceedings in Madrid began on June 28, for instance, China’s Global Times colorfully railed, with nary a metaphor left unmixed, against the participation at a NATO summit for the first time of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, saying: “Catering to NATO's Asia-Pacificization is tantamount to inviting wolves into the house.… The sewage of the Cold War cannot be allowed to flow into the Pacific Ocean.” After the summit, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson ZHAO LIJIAN on Friday singled out Tokyo in particular for attempting to “spearhead NATO’s foray into the Asia-Pacific,” something that would “only stoke bloc confrontation and create antagonism and division in the region.” But it is the way in which the fate of Taiwan and the fate of Ukraine are so closely intertwined that is now at the heart of the matter. Taiwan’s leaders have had 20/20 vision on this from the start of Putin’s Feb. 24 invasion, less than a week after which President TSAI ING-WEN, her vice president, WILLIAM LAI, and Premier SU TSENG-CHANG all agreed to make the symbolically important move of donating a month’s salary for humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The Taiwanese people are also acutely aware of the parallels with Ukraine, and some have even joined the ranks of foreign fighters risking their lives to repel the Russian invasion. Taipei, of course, was delighted at NATO’s new Strategic Concept: “We welcome NATO’s global perspective,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson JOANNE OU told your host on Tuesday. “Taiwan will continue to closely work with democratic partners around the world in response to the hybrid threat posed by authoritarian regimes.” The latest assessment of the actual threat to Taiwan of a Chinese attack came on Sunday when Gen. MARK MILLEY, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the BBC that “whether they would or not, it's a political choice, it's a policy choice, that will be based off of how the Chinese view the cost risk benefit at the time. … There's no indications or warnings of anything imminent at this time." Looking at events in Ukraine, that is hardly surprising. Putin’s invasion is a mess. Beijing would probably view a war in the Taiwan Strait in which it failed to take Taipei and only managed to take slices of the Taiwan islands as a massive public humiliation. Add to that the prospect of a sanctions and isolation campaign to rival the one against Moscow, and, right now at least, Beijing has every good reason to hold back. From wherever America’s allies around the world draw strength and inspiration to pull closer together against Beijing’s aggressive posture, staying that messy course in Ukraine remains the best strategy to avoid a dramatic escalation in the assault on the global order. By highlighting the need to deal with China and Russia’s growing partnership, NATO has got it right in its new Strategic Concept. That offers no immediate relief for the people of Ukraine, but it’s probably the best news anyone can offer at this time to the people of Taiwan.

### Strategic Concept - China High Priority

#### Strategic Concept signals NATO’s pivot to prioritize China as a security threat

Diaz 22 [Ismael Hammounaicha, Contributing Writer for Asia Media International, “EUROPE: RATHER NASTY BILL OF PARTICULARS AGAINST BEIJING,” 07/11/22, <https://asiamedia.lmu.edu/2022/07/11/europe-rather-nasty-bill-of-particulars-against-beijing/>, accessed 07/12/22, GDI-JCR]

The recent 2022 Madrid NATO Summit offered a sense of how much the world order has changed. If one thing is clear, it is that Putin got the opposite of what he wanted: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is stronger and more united than ever. Russia has shifted from being one of NATO’s strategic partners to a major threat for the organization and the world’s stability. The main catalyst for this current situation is its invasion over Ukraine. Rightly or wrongly, China is now also in NATO’s focus. In this critical wartime summit, the organization has highlighted its support for Ukraine in defeating the Russian troops. As an example of NATO’s upturn, Sweden and Finland are slated to become the latest members. This wouldn’t have been possible if Turkey had not dropped their threat to veto as it did right before the summit’s commencement. The justifiable urge of the Nordics to join NATO coincides in its nature with that of other Easter European countries: they worry about any unpredictable assaults the Kremlin may take on their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For this, the organization has updated the 2020 NATO Strategic Concept paper. The organization’s new strategic concept addresses China for the first time since its creation. NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated flatly and dramatically that China has now become a “systemic challenge for Euro-Atlantic safety.” Stoltenberg added that while China is not NATO’s adversary, it “must be clear-eyed about the serious challenges it represents.” The new strategic concept, designed as NATO’s new roadmap, specifies that Beijing’s policies “challenge the organization’s interests, security and values.” The document condemns “the People’s Republic of China’s malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational and disinformation rhetoric [that] target allies and damage the alliance’s security.” NATO warns that the Chinese government is “rapidly expanding” its nuclear capabilities without increasing transparency or engaging in good faith in arms control. This is of concern not only to NATO members, but also to neighboring countries in Asia and Oceania, not to mention the island of Taiwan.

### China threat to Europe

#### China use of tech advantage means extra-regional power projection within the decade – impacting NATO security

**Binnendijk,**  Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council **and Hamilton** Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe**, 2022**

**[**Hans and Daniel, “Strategic Responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense” Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/> GDI-TM]

Third, the Indo-Pacific and European theaters are increasingly linked. U.S. and European ability to address traditional and unconventional threats is becoming intertwined with related challenges to their security interests posed by China. Chinese technological advances, for instance, pose direct security implications for NATO. Huawei’s emergence as a dominant 5G telecommunications infrastructure supplier for many countries gives Beijing access to key parts of emerging communications networks, generating choke points of vulnerability for allied nations. Within 15 years, 5G is likely to be replaced by dual-use 6G technologies with embedded artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled capabilities of military significance. China is likely to incorporate them into its military-civil fusion strategy, as it has with 5G. Beijing is seeking technological dominance in C4ISR, logistical and digital cyber systems, and AI. It is developing quantum technology with military applications in sensing, communications, and data processing. Chinese quantum computing breakthroughs could render alliance encryption systems vulnerable. Beijing has used China Telecom’s “points of presence” in North America and Europe to hijack data traffic through Chinese servers. While currently a regional military power, China will be able to project extra-regional power, including to the Atlantic, in the next decade.[7]

### China war hurts Europe

#### Risk of US China war in the Pacific – multiple impacts including Russia adventurism

**Binnendijk,**  Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council **and Hamilton** Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe**, 2022**

**[**Hans and Daniel, “Strategic Responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense” Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/> GDI-TM]

China’s military growth, its worrying military-technological advances, and its aggressive regional policies have made it America’s pacing factor in developing defense capabilities and policies. China’s aggressive territorial claims in the South and East China Seas, and its threats to the integrity of Taiwan, present a real risk of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, including direct confrontation between China and the United States. In such a situation, critical sea lanes of communication, maritime shipping, and European commercial interactions with China, and with Asia more broadly, would be disrupted. The interests of various European allies in the Indo-Pacific would be at risk. Opportunities would also be created for Russia. U.S. forces might not be available to adequately reinforce European allies against a simultaneous Russian military challenge. The Europeans would need to quickly fill those gaps. They need to plan now how they would do so.